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Lockdowns have now become a fact of life for many countries across the
world, but even if they succeed in halting the spread of Covid-19, are they
sustainable? Martin J. Bull argues that lockdowns pose major challenges for
European countries and the approach pursued by South Korea may need to
be explored as a long-term solution.
Are ‘authoritarian-style’ lockdowns, involving the most significant
restrictions on freedom of movement since the war and huge economic and social
impact, the best way to tackle the coronavirus in democratic states?
What started in Italy (importing the idea from China) is now being followed across
Europe. Yet, aside of the well-known, devastating impact of these measures, they also
have deep political implications which are not pertinent in authoritarian regimes, where
civil liberties are not of paramount concern to the State. The price that democracies pay
in terms of sacrificing our freedoms is a high one.
In Italy, for example, a country with an authoritarian legacy, concerns have been raised
about the extremity of measures which deny citizens even the right to ‘fresh air’ (which is
accorded prisoners in normal times) and go against the principles of personal liberty and
freedom of movement enshrined in the Constitution (even though these can, by the
Constitution, be dispensed with on a temporary basis in emergencies).
And in the UK, the journalist Robert Peston, commenting on the coronavirus bill giving
sweeping new powers to the State, tweeted, ‘There has never in my lifetime been a law
that so encroached on our civil liberties and basic rights as the Coronavirus Bill … It is all
aimed at keeping us safe. But the transfer of unchallengeable power to the state for two
years is huge.’
Of course, the governmental justification for these lockdowns is about following ‘the
science’ – and there are few who, at the point in time that these lockdowns are being
imposed, would doubt their necessity (for an alternative view see Peter Hitchens). Yet,
this policy is not without its flaws, the most evident of which is public compliance, since it
proceeds on the assumption that heavy restrictions on freedom of movement and
association are unproblematic in countries where they have been part of people’s daily
lives since the end of the Second World War.
Even in Italy, at the European forefront of the coronavirus crisis, where a shift in public
awareness of the seriousness of the crisis occurred in the face of a rising number of
cases and deaths, there were over 20,000 violations in the first four days of the national
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lockdown, and violations have continued since – to the ire of many of Italy’s regional
Mayors.
Spain and France have similarly had to apply a rigorous police presence to enforce their
lockdowns, and the UK has had to impose increasingly draconian restrictions on people
partly because of the patent disregard of advice on social distancing by many people
apparently intent on continuing with their normal lives. The lockdowns have also caused
panic-buying and stockpiling of essentials, resulting in overcrowding at supermarkets
and a new breeding ground for the virus.
Credit: Tim Dennell (CC BY-NC 2.0)
Lockdowns also, paradoxically (in view of their aim to limit freedom of movement),
generate significant mass movements of people responding to the measure itself. This
first occurred in Italy when the government placed in lockdown a quarter of the
population – the entire region of Lombardy and 14 neighbouring provinces – with the
result that approximately 25,000 Italians quickly exited the area to reach that part of the
country that was still ‘free’, many of them no doubt carrying the virus with them. This led
the government to change policy within a day and impose a lockdown on the whole
country.
But even a nation-wide lockdown does not disincentivise internal movement, especially
when economic activity is compulsorily ceased and people’s concern focuses on exiting
high-risk areas where possible. France has witnessed thousands exiting Paris for the
countryside. Italy has seen continual movement of people out of the so-called ‘infected
areas’. Indeed, the government’s most recent draconian restrictions – which have
ordered all economic activity to cease unless deemed essential by the government –
were accompanied with the removal of “returning home” as a justification for one’s
movement, because of the fear that a huge number of employees in the north of the
country no longer allowed to work would start heading back to their homes in the south.
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Moreover, a national lockdown does not so much resolve the problem of movement as
displace it to the international level, as soon as other countries begin contemplating the
same thing, thus generating the movement of thousands of people trying to cross
borders to get home or at least out of countries where restrictions are about to be
applied, with pinch-points – airports, train stations, border checkpoints – experiencing
the sort of mass crowding of people national governments have been trying to prevent.
Indeed, governments have ended up issuing advice to their citizens abroad (to repatriate)
which has been in direct contradiction to the restrictions on movement imposed on their
citizens already within their borders. This points up the absence of any real international
coordination in the response to the coronavirus which might have reduced or quelled
this mass movement of peoples across the globe. Nation-states have proceeded with
their policies unilaterally, calling their citizens back home and locking their borders to
deal with an enemy that knows no borders, and thereby unwittingly aiding that enemy’s
advance.
A final problem with national lockdowns is that, by their very nature, they have no ‘exit’
strategy: their ‘containment’ or ‘mitigation’  of the virus is effected through enforcing a
change in public behaviour (with huge economic, social and political costs), which can
help slow the spread as long as that change in behaviour continues to be enforced.
National lockdowns are not therefore sustainable in the long-term either in terms of
their effectiveness or their side-effects.
Is there another alternative to lockdowns? In terms of democratic states, South Korea
stands out for not having gone down the route of territorial lockdowns and for avoiding
severe restrictions on freedom of movement, while at the same time achieving a
significant degree of success in controlling the spread of the virus and not generating
panic-buying amongst its population.
This has been achieved through extraordinary levels of testing, especially to identify
asymptomatic carriers, the quarantining  of infected individuals, contact tracing and then
further testing and other measures to control the spread, reinforced by the use of
technology to track carriers and warn others of a ‘Covid-19 patient’ in their vicinity. This
has allowed Koreans to continue, to a much greater extent than anywhere in Europe and
North America, their everyday lives and economic activities.
The Korean health system has the capacity to test 15,000 people per day and has tested
over a quarter of a million people since the beginning of the outbreak, meaning it has
carried out 3,692 tests per million people (which contrasts, for example, with 5 tests per
million in the United States). It is still experiencing further localised outbreaks of the
virus, but these are dealt with rapidly using the same method.
The approach is based less on mitigating  the spread of the virus through enforcing a
change in public behaviour that is difficult to sustain over the long-term and has no
natural endpoint, than on suppressing the virus whenever and wherever it appears
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through rapid testing and isolation measures. That it works is also evidenced in an
experiment conducted in a small Italian town which (albeit in a situation of lockdown)
managed to reduce new coronavirus cases to zero through precisely this method.
However, this approach requires a capacity in European national health systems – in
terms of equipment, resources and personnel – which they do not currently have, as the
data on testing across countries suggests. In this absence, European democracies are
resorting to the only viable form of state capacity they do possess: to mandate changes
in public behaviour – and see where it takes them.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics
and Policy or the London School of Economics.
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